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Biological Weapons Convention  
Meeting of States Parties 
NGO Statements 
9-13 December 2013  
 
 
Madame Chair:  
 
The University of London* greatly appreciates the opportunity to address the States 
Parties to the Convention.  
 
This meeting marks the end of the CBM discussion for this intersessional cycle. One 
of the key substantive topics that has been raised in the discussion concerned the 
future evolution of the CBM regime: How can it be adapted to today’s political, 
security and scientific contexts? 
 
The underlying purpose of the CBMs has traditionally been seen to be about 
reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions. Our view is that this 
underlying purpose remains essential to the health of the Convention. However, to 
give effect to that traditional purpose in present-day conditions requires a new, 
expanded understanding of what builds confidence. Confidence building in the 
biological field today must also be about setting appropriate examples for others to 
emulate.  
 
Here’s why: The traditional “artefact-centric” approach to regulating unconventional 
weapons – which seeks to control the materials, methods and products involved in 
misuse – is becoming ever-more ill-suited to the life sciences, where the 
technologies are less about hardware, equipment and tools, and more about people, 
processes and know-how. Dual-use, or multi-use, life science technologies are 
increasingly diffuse, globalised and multidisciplinary and are often based on 
intangible information rather than on specialised materials and equipment. This 
changes the definition of the problem from a material- and equipment-based threat 
that can be eliminated to a knowledge-based risk that must be managed.  
 
Risk-based regulation involves a plurality of public and private actors, instruments 
and purposes that can be grouped into three modes of governance: “hard law”, “soft 
law” and “informal law”: 
 
• “Hard-law” is based on the authority of the state and accompanied by penalties 
for noncompliance; it includes statutory regulations, reporting requirements, and 
mandatory licensing, certification and registration.  
• “Soft-law” is less formal and based on conceptions of what is socially desirable; it 
includes professional self-governance, codes of practice, and guidelines.  
• “Informal law” involves the emulation of successful practices and models of 
behaviour; it includes national and international standards, education and 
awareness-raising.  
 
All three modes of governance play important roles in influencing, identifying and 
inhibiting those who seek to misuse the life sciences. Truly effective management of 
the knowledge-based risk posed by dual-use life science technologies must therefore 
couple hard-law with both soft-law and informal law. 
 
So in addition to national implementation of the BWC, it is important that 
governments support bottom-up codes of practice initiatives; education, outreach and 
awareness-raising initiatives; and so on. But, at the same time, governments also 
have to act as the ultimate role model. Governments have to look inward at 
themselves and demonstrate outward to others that their own house is in order. 
 
And this is where the CBMs of the BWC come in. 
 
The process of collecting and submitting information for CBM submissions provides a 
mechanism for individual governments to draw domestic stakeholders together, to 
focus internal inter-agency or inter-departmental coordination, and to increase their 
awareness and oversight of relevant national biological activity. 
 
Complete, accurate and annual CBM submissions demonstrate to your peers in 
government and to peers in other governments that you have your house in order. 
And for the growing number of States Parties who choose to maximise transparency 
and make their CBMs publicly available, you also demonstrate that you have your 
house in order to other – equally significant – stakeholders in managing the risks that 
biology may be misused. 
  
We strongly encourage States Parties, in their preparations for the next Review 
Conference, to make explicit their understanding of what builds confidence and what 
expansion this requires in giving effect to the traditional purpose of CBMs in present-
day conditions. We hope they will also say how they see the CBM regime evolving in 
the future. 
 
Madame Chair, before we conclude, we would like to take this opportunity to thank 
you for the work you’ve done this year, especially your efforts to bring in more voices. 
The future of biological disarmament and non-proliferation lies in outreach to the 
ever-growing number of stakeholders and in effective links and partnerships between 
governments, civil society, national and international scientific and medical 
associations, and industry. Your efforts, Madam Chair, to broaden the active 
participation of both states and others, like ourselves, in the formal meetings is an 
important part of fostering and benefiting from the multi-level stakeholdership crucial 
to managing biological threats today. 
 
We wish you all a productive week, and look forward to continuing our engagement 
with you on CBMs and on other BWC-related issues. 
 
 
Mr Nicholas Sims 
Emeritus Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics & Political Science 
 
Dr Filippa Lentzos  




                                                
* The University of London dates from 1836, and is a major component of the higher 
education sector in the United Kingdom and beyond.  It has evolved into a confederation of 
academically and financially autonomous colleges, which continue to share some central 
University of London institutions and a long history of joint endeavours in education and 
research.  King’s College London (founded 1829) was one of the two original colleges of the 
University of London.  The London School of Economics & Political Science (founded 1895) 
became a college of the University of London in 1900. 
